Future of UN Partnerships in Peace keeping
Peacekeeping is a unique and dynamic instrument developed by the United Nations Organization as a way to help countries torn by conflict create conditions for lasting peace, Kaurin, P. M. (2007). The first UN peacekeeping mission was established in 1948, when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbours. Since then, there have been a total of 63 UN peacekeeping operations around the world.Over the years, UN peacekeeping has evolved to meet the demands of different conflicts and a changing political landscape. Born at the time when the Cold War rivalries frequently paralyzed the Security Council, UN peacekeeping goals were primarily limited to maintaining ceasefires and stabilizing situations on the ground, so that efforts could be made at the political level to resolve the conflict by peaceful means (Shorey et al 2004).
Those missions consisted of military observers and lightly armed troops with monitoring, reporting and confidence-building roles in support of ceasefires and limited peace agreements. With the end of the Cold War, the strategic context for UN peacekeeping dramatically changed, prompting the Organization to shift and expand its field operations from “traditional” missions involving strictly military tasks, to complex “multidimensional” enterprises designed to ensure the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements and assist in laying the foundations for sustainable peace. Today’s peacekeepers undertake a wide variety of complex tasks, from helping to build sustainable institutions of governance, to human rights monitoring, to security sector reform, to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants.
UN peacekeeping continues to evolve, both conceptually and operationally, to meet new challenges and political realities. Faced with the rising demand for increasingly complex peace operations, the United Nations in the past few years has been overstretched and challenged as never before. It has therefore become increasingly common that UN peacekeepers work alongside members of peacekeeping missions organized by regional and sub-regional organizations to enhance their own capacities.
The formation of such “partnerships” has attracted a lot attention. At the institutional level for example we have observed such partnership in the deployment of the EU and AU peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Burundi in 2003 as part of the UN peacekeeping mission. Of recent partnership has been made a priority in Peace Operations and has been influenced by the memorandum on peacekeeping reform issued by the then chief of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Jean-Marie Guehenno, in November 2005.There are generally two identifiable dimensions of partnership. These include the operational partnership which is a mission-to-mission partnership in a specific conflict situation, for example the kind that was deployed in Bosnia.
On the other hand there is the institutional partnership which involves contributive efforts between secretariats of the organizations concerned on issues related to mission preparation and management. As exhibited in this paper, it is the latter dimension that has been developed most steadily with the AU. It has been argued that since its inception in the Cold War years, peacekeeping has long been, United Nations peacekeeping.With the increase of regional peace operations however, this picture is being changed.
Historically, the evolution of UN peacekeeping can be described in two ways. One is related to the well-noted expansion of tasks and functions from ceasefire monitoring and force separation to far more comprehensive activities. These undertakings today include elements of peace building and even transitional administration.
The other element, which is the focus of this paper, is concerned with the expansion of actors engaged in peacekeeping activities. The issue of partnership is crucial in understanding the current phase of this evolution, and its future implications for the UN. The themes that this paper will grapple with include, for example, the ways partnerships have been changing the concept of UN peacekeeping and the choices the UN is faced with in mapping its role in globalized peacekeeping. These are the central themes that I intend to consider in this paper.This paper conducts an overview of regional peacekeeping efforts since the early 1990s and the various roles the UN has played with regard to each of them.
Against this background, it traces how debates on peacekeeping partnership have developed at the UN during the same period. On this basis, the concluding part of this paper identifies the current state of peacekeeping partnership, and canvasses the potential role of the UN-AU partnership in the future.
Regional Peacekeeping and Operational Partnerships: An Overview
It is noticeable that since the early 1990s, there has been a steady increase in the number of regional peacekeeping missions organised by regional and sub-regional bodies, many of which enter into some sort of operational partnership with UN missions. This provides a background to the debate on the idea of partnership and through it, to the development of institutional partnership. It is necessary to clarify what is meant by regional peacekeeping. This paper’s focus on institutional partnership between the UN and regional organizations specifically the AU secretariat in peacekeeping matters and excludes certain types of activities that include wider term of peace operations.
Therefore, the analysis shall not include various diplomatic, observer, human rights, situation monitoring, and electoral monitoring missions that generally lack formed military or police units.The reason for this exclusion is that in considering our core question the real importance of regional peacekeeping lies in the fact that these regional organizations came to organize operations precisely beyond these smaller missions. The fact that they started deploying missions with some “teeth” produces implications that deserve exploration.
Secondly, despite this last point, multinational and national forces, some of which worked with UN peacekeepers, are also excluded from the list: Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (1997.1-98.4, Central African Republic), Britain’s Operation Palliser (2000.5-6, Sierra Leone) and France’s Operation Licorne (2002.9-, Ivory Coast), are notable examples.They are excluded because they were not formed by regional or subregional organizations. These military interventions draw on the same military resources that states could have used, at least in some situations, for UN or regional missions. In that sense, the increasingly frequent use of such interventions by some developed states may be seen as continuous with the rise of regional peacekeeping; and their implications for UN peacekeeping may in part be indicated by the implications of regional peacekeeping whose exploration is the theme of this paper.
In short, this paper focuses on peace operations organized by regional or subregional organizations and equipped with military or police components. Thus defined, regional peacekeeping operations and their relationships with the UN are summarized in the chart below.
Table 1 Regional peace keeping
SituationOperationsUN-AU rolesLiberia ECOWAS(ECOMOG):ECOMIL: 2003) 1990-9,SCE(ECOMOG: Res 788, 866), SCA (ECOMIL, Res 1497)COD(ECOMOG&UNOMIL-UNOL) FOD(ECOMIL UNMIL)Sierra LeoneECOWAS(ECOMOG: 1997-00)SCE(Res 1132, 1162, 1181) COD(UNOMSIL) FOD(UNAMSIL)LesothoSADC(Boleas: 1998-99)3Guinea BissauECOWAS(ECOMOG: 1998-99)SCE(Res 1216, 1233) [COD (UNOGBIS)]Ivory CoastECOWAS(ECOMICI: 2002-04)SCE(Res 1464, 1479, 1498, 1527)COD(MINUCI) FOD(UNOCI)Central African RepublicCEMAC (FOCUM 2002-08), CEEAC (MICOPAX: 2008-)SCE (PRST/2002/28)SCE (PRST/2002/28) COD (BONUCA)BurundiAU(AMIB: 2003-4)SCE(Res 1545)FOD(ONUB)DRCEU(Artemis: 2003, EUFOR RD Congo: 2006)SCA (Artemis: Res 1484, RD Congo: Res 1671) COD(MONUC)Darfur (Sudan)AU(AMIS: 2004-07, UNAMID: 2007-)SCE(AMIS: Res 1556, 1574) SCA(UNAMID: Res 1769, 1828) COD(AMIS&UNAMIS-UNMIS) [FOD(AMIS-UNMIS)] JOD(UNAMID)4SomaliaAU(AMISOM, 2007-) [IGAD (IGASOM, 2005 07)]SCA(IGASOM: Res 1725, AMISOM: Res 1744, 1772, 1831) COD (UNPOS)ComorosAU (MAES, 2007-)SCA(IGASOM: Res 1725, AMISOM: Res 1744, 1772, 1831) COD (UNPOS)Eastern Chad/ North-Eastern CAREU(EUFORTCHAD/RCA, 2007-)SCA(Res 1778, 1834) COD (MINURCAT) FOD (MINURCAT-expanded)Sources: AU, EU, UN and University of Montreal Francophone Research Network on Peace Operations websites. Note: COD (co-deployment), JOD (joint operation), FOD (follow-on deployment), PRD (preceding deployment), SCA (Security Council authorization), SCE (Security Council endorsement).The table above is in chronological order, based on the time at which a regional peacekeeping mission was first established for the given situation.
This table produces several observations.First, the number of regional organizations that have deployed peacekeeping missions under their helm is rather limited. It is noticeable that in Africa ECOWAS is far ahead of the other sub-regional bodies which initiated (or planned, as IGAD did) relatively small-scale deployments. But from the transformation of the OAU into the AU and the subsequent planning of the African Standby Forces (ASF), these sub-regional efforts came to be gradually organized around the division of labour. For example, the shift from CEMAC (FOMUC) to CEEAC (MICOPAX), one of the five sub-regional organizations expected to develop the ASF constituent forces, as the host of the mission in Central Africa, can be understood in these terms.Second, in terms of the evolution of regional peacekeeping the year 2003 was the most important for Africa; comprehensive regional organizations organized their peacekeeping missions for the first time.
For example, the AU organized AMIB in Burundi.With regard to the roles of the UN, I have taken a more inclusive approach than my approach to regional peacekeeping. While taking a rather narrow definition of regional operations by excluding smaller formations, I have included the UN roles to include not just peacekeeping missions but also political missions as well as Security Council decision makings. This disparity is justified by the focus of this paper, which is on the implications of peacekeeping partnerships for the UN.
The relationship between regional and UN missions straightforwardly constitutes what was earlier termed operational partnership. It is also important to look at Security Council decision making with regard to each of these regional missions, because the availability and the content of Council resolutions provide a unique asset for the UN in forging partnerships.There are at least four patterns of operational partnership: co-deployment, follow-on deployment, preceding deployment, and joint operation. The most common pattern is co-deployment. A consistent pattern has emerged in which the UN mission maintains a civilian side of the tasks while the regional mission provides military presence.
This was the typical experience with ECOWAS (e.g., ECOMOG was in charge of supervising the military aspects of the 25 July 1993 peace agreement, while UNOMIL monitoring the peace process). In some situations, regional missions provided over-the-horizon military surge capability, as happened in Liberia where ECOMIL was deployed between August and September 2003; and in the DRC where the EU deployed a military peacekeeping mission in response to the clashes between local armed elements in the Ituri region (Operation Artemis, 2003.6-8). However, this pattern does not apply to AU deployments.Operational partnerships have also been made in two different sequential patterns.
In one, rarer pattern, a UN mission is followed by a regional operation. This has not yet been experienced in Africa but happened in Bosnia where the IPTF, as part of UNMIBH, was replaced by the EUPM in 2003; and Kosovo, where there are plans for EULEX replacing the law enforcement functions of UNMIK in the post-Status period.They are both relatively small operations.The more common pattern is one in which a regional mission is followed by a UN peacekeeping mission. The tendency here is in a clear contrast to the preceding deployment, because the follow-on UN operation is usually larger in size and more comprehensive in mandate. In order to see why this tends to happen, it is useful to briefly consider the circumstances in which follow-on deployments were deemed necessary.
In Ivory Coast, ECOMICI and MINUCI (UN political mission) were replaced by UNOCI, because ECOMICI was beset by the lack of institutional, logistical and financial capacity to sustain the operation from the start. In Burundi, AMIB contingents are rehatted as ONUB for similar reasons.In Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL was established in response to the Nigerian decision to pull its troops from the country, which constituted the bulk of ECOMOG peacekeepers. MINURCAT was expected to deploy a military component to succeed EUFOR after its mandate expired on 15 March 2009.Along with their operations in the DRC in 2003 and 2006, the EU military deployments to African conflicts are characterized by short time spans, which in turn indicate the existence of the political imperative to avoid prolonged field commitment. These illustrations suggest that UN missions are expected because regional missions are unable to sustain their deployed missions in a longer term.
When regional missions that include military or police components are organized, they usually limit their activities to military or police-related tasks only. They do not possess the wide range of civilian expertise and human resources that the UN can mobilize. Whereas in the case of EU missions, this limitation appears to be by design where the EU is not willing to organize the multidimensional operations that have become the norm in UN peacekeeping, in African missions, they simply are not sufficiently resourced for long-term deployment and their troop contributing countries find it relatively easier to withdraw troops from these missions than from UN missions. In these circumstances, UN peacekeeping missions are expected because of their multidimensional capacity and more steady availability of resources.The joint (or “hybrid”) operation of UNAMID seems an entirely new arrangement, but can be seen as a peculiar type of follow-on deployment.
Indeed, Resolution 1706 (31 August 2006) envisaged the expansion of UNMIS to Darfur and its taking-over of AMIS by the end of 2006, but the Sudanese government’s resistance to the plan forced the UN to replace it with a three-phase support package that would culminate in a UN-AU hybrid operation (UNAMID).For our purposes UNAMID’s uniqueness may be noted in a combination of three aspects: command and control structure, financing, and personnel. UNAMID’s leadership, both civilian as well as military and police, consists of jointly appointed personnel with the joint AU-UN Special Representative at the top who reports both to the AU Commission Chairperson and the UN Secretary-General.However, in response to the government’s wariness against outside intervention, the UN and AU jointly decided that the force would be “a predominantly African character”,as a result of which the senior leadership as well as the bulk of the UNAMID force were occupied by Africans. On the other hand, financing would be based on the UN assessed contributions.
Article name: Future of UN Partnerships in Peace keeping essay, research paper, dissertation